What Kind of History is the History of Being? A Critical Examination

Abstract

The project of a history of being, which Heidegger begins to elaborate from the 1930s onwards, must face multiple criticisms in order to account for its coherence. In particular, the philosopher is accused of having brought together the history of metaphysics unto one single and exclusive guiding thread (the question of being). The lasts posthumous publications help us reconsider this interpretation and allows us to face its usual criticisms. In this contribution, taking as the starting point numerous comments and notes scattered in his private writings, we will try to elucidate what kind of history the history of being represents. We will argue that it contains new possibilities, methodological and conceptual resources that deserve close attention. In this respect, some passages underline that the history of being would be the continuation of the phenomenological destruction already announced in Being and Time. Finally, as the philosopher points out, perhaps the history of being would be capable of founding a different interrogation of historiography or historical science (Historie), giving new perspectives to classical problems.