The Meaning of Transcendental Cognition in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Abstract

The aim of this article is to explain what is meant by “transcendental cognition” in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, especially by clarifying the reasons why he modified in the second edition the definition in A 11f. First, I focus on Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s conception of ontology, and explain why Kant’s definition of transcendental cognition in the first edition must have been unsatisfactory for him. Second, I elaborate on the reasons for the correction introduced by Kant in 1787 (B 25). I argue that only the latter formulation reveals the originality of transcendental cognition with respect to Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s ontology, because such a formulation clarifies that transcendental cognition focuses on our specific kind of cognition (unsere Erkenntnißart), as opposed to the indeterminacy that, according to Kant, the ontology of his predecessors suffers from. Finally, I offer a brief critical discussion on the basis of these results.