Efectos de las alternativas para alcanzar un acuerdo sobre el desarrollo de soluciones integradoras a los problemas. Los efectos colaterales debilitadores de las BATNAs

Abstract

Best alternatives for a negotiation agreement (BATNAs) have been hypothesized to play an important role in bargaining. Greater alternatives are associated with increased power and outcomes in distributive bargaining contexts. We hypothesized that mutual alternatives relative to asymmetric or no alternatives will inhibit processes that lead to the achievement of high joint benefits. The results of a bargaining simulation indicate partial support for the hypothesis. Bargaining dyads having mutual alternatives tended to deadlock more than those in asymmetric or no alternative conditions. As a result, the joint benefits of bargainers possessing mutual alternatives were attenuated. When controlling for joint benefits, there was a negative relationship between having a BATNA and satisfaction with the bargaining outcomes. Bargaining dyads having asymmetric alternatives experienced no deadlocks and the highest level of joint benefits. This bargaining advantage appeared due in part to the higher willingness to agree associated with the low power bargainer in the asymmetric condition.. However, a significant portion of the relationship between alternatives and joint benefits is left unaccounted for by any of the communication variables measured in this study.