Unleashed particularity and constrained particularity: Max Stirner and Carl Schmitt on civil society and the State in Hegel

Abstract

In Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the complex theoretical tension between particularity and universality is key to understanding the notions of civil society and the State. This paper aims to transfer the significance of this tensional duality in Hegel to the intertwined understanding of Stirner and Schmitt, to suggest a negative connection between them that moves away from the already explored theological-political angles and rests comparatively on a Hegelian framework. Thus, it will be argued that Stirner advocates egoism linked to a unilateral understanding of civil particularity, while Schmitt, from a unilateral view of Hegelian universality, defends a state that is hostile to particularity. Ultimately, from this indirect dissent on Hegelian grounds will emerge a possibility of positivisation of the Stirner-Schmitt interaction from a shared notion of pre-intellectual and decisional individuality.