Philosophical foundations of R.G. Boscovich's determinism
Abstract
This paper examines the foundations of the determinism proposed by the physicist R. G. Boscovich, focusing on the main aspects of his theory of matter and his treatment of the problem of chance. To do so, we begin with a conceptual clarification of the concept of "determinism", especially in the context of 18th century philosophy and science. Next, we examine the Leibnizian and Newtonian sources of Boscovich's cosmology, paying attention to those aspects that are relevant to the subsequent understanding of his proposal. Finally, his arguments in favour of causal determinism are examined, and the basis of this proposal is analysed: the principle of sufficient reason, the divine will or the law of continuity. It is concluded that, despite a certain manifest rejection of the principle of sufficient reason, it constitutes the foundation of Boscovian determinism.
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