Kant on the faculty of desire and the case of pleasure
Abstract
At first glance, Kant’s understanding of the faculty of desire and the role of feeling in it may appear straightforward. However, when one attempts to offer a more detailed conception, several, ultimately related problems arise. What exactly does Kant mean when he claims that in the lower faculty of desire, pleasure in the reality of an object must always be presupposed? How exactly should we understand the incentive [Triebfeder], that, according to Kant, moves us to action? What is the role of the feeling of respect in the faculty of desire? This paper aims to offer a comprehensive account of the functioning of the faculty of desire, reconstructed from rather dispersed allusions and remarks throughout the Kantian corpus, with the goal of clarifying the role that feeling plays within it.
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