The Wissenschaftslehre and its Relation to Phenomenology. Husserlian Reflections on the Foundations of Sciences

Abstract

The article addresses the relation between the Wissenschaftslehre (pure logic, mathesis universalis) and phenomenology. First, I will analyze the meaning and scope of the Husserlian project of a doctrine of science as the study of the logical conditions which every theory must fulfil for being considered as such, which is framed on the correlation between the interconnexion of objective truths and the interconnexion of things. Second, I will examine why the account of fundamental concepts (and propositional combinations, general laws, and the theory of manifolds) leads to the question about the phenomenological origin, i.e., to the inquiry about the subjective performances of consciousness. On the one hand, I will argue that the Wissenschaftslehre and phenomenology are two different projects with some autonomy, but they are both related in a complementary sense. On the other hand, I will explain why, even when the Wissenschaftslehre and sciences may work as an objective knowledge, only phenomenology enables to overcome the naivety of the ideal ‘in itself’ by making explicit the sense given by intentional consciousness.