Is Dennett’s ‘Cartesian theater’ really Cartesian?: A critical analysis from the perspective of trialism and the ens per se debate

Abstract

This article examines how separability and the mind-body union are key to show how the
‘Cartesian theater’ metaphor created by Dennett is inappropriate as a critique of Descartes’ account
of unified conscious experience. The first section introduces the problem of Cartesian separability.
The second examines how mind and body, separable and conceivable according to Descartes, end up
being distinct metaphysical substances. The last section emphasizes the dis-analogy argument of the
ship and its pilot, and how, according to Descartes, mind and body are closely united as an ens per se,
even though they are separable. In view of this, we criticize Dennett’s ‘Cartesian theater’ metaphor: it is
impossible for the mind to be a mere spectator, as conscious experience is already unified–somatized
even. We observe, finally, that despite Dennett there is cognitive science research that coincide with
Descartes in arguing that the mind-body union is close-for example, those who defend that mind is
embodied, embedded or extended.