Leibniz’s conception of space: substantivalism, monism and substance-like relationism. A brief sketch from a genealogical survey

Abstract

In this paper, the main features of the evolution of Leibniz’s conception of space are examined. Through a genealogical approach, our task is to show that, in its historical development, such conception is subjected to two outstanding transitions which separate and distinguish three theoretical versions. In his youth (before 1670), Leibniz proposes a substantivalist conception of space. However, because of Leibniz’s adoption of nominalism, this conception undergoes there a first transformation and it turns into a substance-like monism, notably consolidated in the middle period of Leibniz’s philosophy (1680-1690). In the late period (1690 onwards), Leibniz reformulates finally, in a second transition, his concept of space, which takes the form of -what we call- a substance-like relationism.