The Principle of Non-Contradiction in the Skeptic Argumentation: Implications and Consequences
Keywords:
Aristotle, contradiction, skepticism, Sextus Empiricus.
Abstract
The use, by the pyrronian scepticism, of an argumentative pattern based on the notion of contradicition leads us to think that said notion plays an important role among the basic starting points of its philosophy. Therefore, it appears as essential to start a detailed analysis of the implications of this notion inside the classic sceptical argument, in order to determinate the presence of implications derived from the principle of non-contradiction, and their compatibility with the philosophical position that corresponds to this hellenistic school.Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
Article download
Crossmark
Published
2012-06-07
How to Cite
Pajón I. (2012). The Principle of Non-Contradiction in the Skeptic Argumentation: Implications and Consequences. Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía, 29(1), 13-25. https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_ASHF.2012.v29.n1.39452
Issue
Section
Estudios
License
In order to support the global exchange of knowledge, the journal Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofia is allowing unrestricted access to its content as from its publication in this electronic edition, and as such it is an open-access journal. The originals published in this journal are the property of the Complutense University of Madrid and any reproduction thereof in full or in part must cite the source. All content is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 use and distribution licence (CC BY 4.0). This circumstance must be expressly stated in these terms where necessary. You can view the summary and the complete legal text of the licence.
