Lost in Translation: The Distinction between Mens-Anima-Intellectum in Spinoza’s Philosophy and its Conceptual Relevance in Ethica V

Abstract

The objective of this article is to unravel a philosophical problem in Spinoza’s thought that, under the appearance of a semantic difficulty linked to translation, shows the complexity of the relationships between the mind and the intellect, as well as the consequences that arise. They derive from the ontology of immanence in the Fifth Part of Ethics. This difficulty arises from the meanings of the terms Anima, Mens, and Intellectum in Spinoza’s philosophy. To address this, the indissoluble identity between Mens and the body will be analyzed, highlighting the radical nature of the ontology of immanence in contrast to the substantialization introduced by Descartes. Furthermore, the article proposes a reinterpretation of the meaning of Mens in Spinoza’s ontology through the exposition of the intellectual love of God as an experience of the third kind of knowledge. We argue that it is in the Fifth Part of the Ethics where the materialist significance of Spinoza’s conception of Mens is most clearly reflected.