Negation and affirmation in the Stocism: Apuleius, Alejandro, and Boethius
Abstract
The article deals with the Stoic denial and its criticism of the Aristotelian formula according to the testimonies of Apuleius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Boethius. The criticism is divided into three aspects: (i) systematicity (since the same rule does not apply to all types of propositions); (ii) universality (since any contradictory pair does not divide truth and falsehood without exception); and (iii) accuracy (since the subject of the proposition may not exist or may not be what we think it is). It is concluded that the background of the criticism is not related to the fact that a formula is inconsistent or makes logic and its operations impossible, but rather which formula is more ambiguous and less preferable.
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