Heinrich Rickert and the Paradox of the Beginning of Philosophy
Abstract
This paper studies Heinrich Rickert’s Neo-Kantian interpretation of the beginning of philosophy as a correlation between subject and object. Firstly, we reconstruct the problematic background of Rickert’s interpretation of the problem of beginning and his distinction between three meanings of the concepto of ‘beginning’. Secondly, we offer an interpretation of the correlational beginning of philosophy as a reply to Hegel’s paradox of beginning in the Science of Logic. Finally, we offer an evaluation of this correlational interpretation of the beginning of philosophy in light of the general project of a transcendental philosophy.
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