Freedom's Relationality and Transcendence in the thought of John Duns Scotus

Abstract

John Duns Scotus is one of the medieval thinkers who most strongly affirmed the uniqueness of the free active powers of the soul by drawing a sharp distinction between those powers and the natural active powers of the soul. This position brought him to certain conclusions that seemed too strong, even for his contemporaries who shared many of his philosophical and theological convictions. As a consequence, Scotus is sometimes presented as a medieval forerunner of the distinctly modern view of freedom as absolute autonomy. This article considers three aspects of his thought that enable one to offer a more complete picture of his view on the nature of freedom: the relationship between the known object and the act of the will, his understanding of the will’s affectiones, and his account of the will’s perfection in beatitude. By engaging Scotus’s own texts as well as contemporary debates on each of these aspects of his account of freedom, I identify some key elements of his thought that can be useful for a systematic exposition on the nature of freedom.