On the different functions of the transcendental object in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

Abstract

The present article attempts to describe the problematic of the notion of transcendental object both in the exegetical discus-sion of Kant's theoretical philosophy and in the Critique of Pure Reason. In a first instance, it will be possible to verify a consensus about the meaning that the term under discussion assumes in the Transcendental Analytic. However, commen-tators have not succeeded in distinguishing the function of the transcendental object in the Transcendental Dialectic. Accordingly, an attempt will be made to break down the problematic passages in order to arrive at a new function of the transcendental object as a holistic projection of consciousness, whose main purpose is to endow material experience with unity as a whole, and thereby articulate the basis for a system of perceptions developed in Kant's late work.