The order of reasons in Kant’s ethical thought

Abstract

This article offers a proposal for reconstructing the “order of reasons” in Kant’s ethical thought, intending thereby to contribute to the discussion of its internal structure and of the place where it has to be situated within Early Modern thinking. In particular, this article critically discuss the widespread routine of presenting the demand of universality as the first principle of Kantian ethics, and tries to show that such demand is not the first step in the order of reasons. That order –so runs our main claim– begins in an earlier and more primary stage, and this has a direct impact on the meaning and position that must be attributed to the project of an “autonomous ethics”. Because of that, and on the basis of this claim, the last part of the article confronts some important and already classic interpretations (such as Tugendhat’s and Prauss’) about the meaning and location of that project within Early Modern philosophy.