Tschirnhaus and relational physics
Abstract
Scholars have considered that Spinoza’s difficulties in dealing with the objections raised by Tschirnhaus against his physical approaches were the spur that led the latter to dissociate himself from the former in the field of natural philosophy. The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to refute this misjudgment and, on the other, to show that the cause of it lies in having dismissed a significant post-Cartesian current of thought, buried in oblivion by the triumph of Newtonian mechanics, which intended to develop a physics in purely relational terms. In turn, this will allow us to read the physical proposals of Spinoza and Tschirnhaus as paradigmatic examples of this relational physics.
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