The founding value of "esse" in the Thomist fourth way
Abstract
Throughout practically his entire philosophical career, Étienne Gilson maintained that the five ways were based on the original Tomasian doctrine of the esse. On the other hand, towards the end of his career, he realized that this thesis entailed serious fundamental problems, which led him to reject it and defend the opposite, that the esse is absent in all of them. For his part, A. L. González, in his study of the fourth way, challenged this argument. In the present study I intend to confront both positions and justify the validity of the Gilsonian position.
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