Sense perception and imagination in the philosophy of Anne Conway
Abstract
The philosophy of Anne Finch, Viscountness of Conway has been studied from several perspectives such as the critical rol of the vitalist monism regarding its philosophical contemporaries, as well its value in the history of philosophy. However, there is little attention to her epistemological thesis owing to the fragmentary nature of the Principles of the most ancient and modern philosophy (1690). This article asummes that it is possible to systematize the philosophy of this modern women philosopher, which implies the reconstruction of her epistemological ideas through concepts as sense perception and imagination. This allow us, not only to understand this ideas under the logic of its correlation with with Conway’s ontology and morals, in addition allow us to access to an original proposal that is alternative to the ruling mechanical models of its time.
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