Paul Karl Feyerabend: The Projections of Theoretical Proliferation in the Relation Science-Metaphysics

Abstract

The Paul Karl Feyerabend’s doctrine of theoretical proliferation has been interpreted by his experts as an attempt to preserve the ideal of scientific progress. This hermeneutics describes, in part, the intention of our philosopher. However, this reading does not explain the fundamental criticism that theoretical pluralism supposes for Feyerabend. The theoretical proliferation is itself a reductio ad absurdum of the attempts of logical positivism and critical rationalism to define science at the expense of the metaphysical. This article presents the theoretical proliferation as a vindication of the positive role that the metaphysical plays in scientific practice. We expose the Feyerabend’s defense of metaphysics inasmuch as it is constitute the possibility to overcome the conceptual conservatism, to increase empirical content of science and to recover the descriptive value of scientific theories.