Plotinus, Platonic Forms and Aristotelic noûs

Abstract

If historians of philosophy are right by considering Plotinus the most important representative of Neo-Platonism, the question arises as what new element he proposes when intending to reformulate the philosophy of Plato. To answer this question, I will focus on Plotinus’ reformulation of the so-called ‘theory of Ideas’, cornerstone of the Platonic gnoseology. We will see that, far from merely repeating the arguments of Plato, Plotinus embraces the different philosophical doctrines developed through the six centuries that separates him from Plato. On the one hand, this allows him to overcome objections that have been raised against the Platonic intuitions and, on the other hand, to build a much more precise conceptual apparatus to support the Platonic thought. Particularly important in this respect is Plotinus’ use of the doctrine of Intellect (νοῦς) developed by Aristotle in Metaphysics XII and widely discussed in the centuries after the Stagirite. My discussion on the Aristotelian mediation on the Plotinian exegesis of the Platonic gnoseology aims at showing that some of the weakest points of Plato’s ‘theory of Ideas’ are strengthened by Plotinus’ use of Aristotelian doctrines, even when the Stagirite distanced himself from some of the most important points of Plato’s gnoseology. I will then try to show that some of Plotinus’ most daring thesis – such as his “Intellect is all things” or the reduction of knowledge to selfknowledge – are the consequence of taking certain Aristotelian intuitions ‘to the extreme’ in his pursuit of further laying the foundations of Plato’s thought.