Aphantasia and Phenomenology. A terminological analysis
Abstract
In 2015, the neuroscientists Adam Zeman, Michaela Dewar and Sergio Della Casa coined the term aphantasia to refer to the difficulty or impairment to evoke mental images that affects a significant percentage of the world's population. The conceptualisation of this phenomenon was inspired by Aristotle's Treatise on the Soul. However, a close reading of the passages devoted to fantasy in Aristotle’s work, does not coincide with the scientific description of the condition. This article proposes conceptual distinctions based on Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, with the aim of finding a terminology that facilitates the philosophical understanding of aphantasia. We show that Husserl’s phenomenological distinction between ‘image consciousness’ and phantasy is useful for a better description of cases of individuals with aphantasy.
Downloads
Article download
Crossmark
License
In order to support the global exchange of knowledge, the journal Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofia is allowing unrestricted access to its content as from its publication in this electronic edition, and as such it is an open-access journal. The originals published in this journal are the property of the Complutense University of Madrid and any reproduction thereof in full or in part must cite the source. All content is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 use and distribution licence (CC BY 4.0). This circumstance must be expressly stated in these terms where necessary. You can view the summary and the complete legal text of the licence.
