Is weakness of will possible in Plato’s Laws? Platonic drifts regarding a Socratic problem
Abstract
Platonic philosophy is deeply marked by an epistemological concern. In this context Plato adopts the so called “Socratic Intellectualism”, which implies a strong rejection of the possibility of incontinent actions, weakness of will or akrasía. In this paper I will try to show that Plato himself undertook a revision of that Socratic theory in the Laws, above all because of a profound change in his conception regarding human nature.Downloads
Article download
License
In order to support the global exchange of knowledge, the journal Revista de Filosofía is allowing unrestricted access to its content as from its publication in this electronic edition, and as such it is an open-access journal. The originals published in this journal are the property of the Complutense University of Madrid and any reproduction thereof in full or in part must cite the source. All content is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 use and distribution licence (CC BY 4.0). This circumstance must be expressly stated in these terms where necessary. You can view the summary and the complete legal text of the licence.