The role of hypotheses in the natural philosophy of Isaac Newton
Abstract
The interpretative field on Newton's work has been widely discussed and, particularly, the subject of hypotheses has not been the exception. The aim of this paper is to show that the natural philosophy of Newton seemed, in principle, to reject the hypothesis, but it is not opposed to the formulation of these if we distinguish what kind of hypothesis we mean. Thus, I will show, first, how Newton develops its natural philosophy, and how he opposed to the hypotheses. Then I will show that under certain conditions the hypotheses are accepted. And therefore, I conclude that the philosophy of Newton not radically rejects the hypothesis, but, on the contrary, he may use them for the scientific development, depending on what type of hypothesis is referred.
Downloads
Article download
Crossmark
License
In order to support the global exchange of knowledge, the journal Revista Electrónica de Pensamiento Moderno y Metodología en Historia de las Ideas is allowing unrestricted access to its content as from its publication in this electronic edition, and as such it is an open-access journal. The originals published in this journal are the property of the Complutense University of Madrid and any reproduction thereof in full or in part must cite the source. All content is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 use and distribution licence (CC BY 4.0). This circumstance must be expressly stated in these terms where necessary. You can view the summary and the complete legal text of the licence.
