El valor de lo diferente: sobre la interpretación de Matheron de la "Ética" de Spinoza
Abstract
This paper critiques Matheron’s interpretation of propositions 29 to 35 of the fourth part of Spinoza’s ethics, in which it is stated that, in Spinoza’s system, only the similar is beneficial to the similar. It is argued that this interpretation is incoherent with important aspects of spinozist ontology in which difference is crucial to increase a body’s power of acting; and an alternative reading of the propositions is suggested.Downloads
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