Atmospheres, Environments, and Affects

Abstract

Over the past decade, a debate on atmospheres has developed among philosophers (see, e.g., Schmitz 2016; Böhme 2017; Griffero 2017; Jagnow 2024; Fernandez Velasco and Niikawa 2025). Examples of atmospheres are the joyful atmosphere exuding from a lively party; the shady atmosphere of a run-down back alley; the poignant atmosphere of Venice, Italy. Philosophers working in the phenomenological tradition, such as Gernot Böhme and Tonino Griffero, typically characterize atmospheres as “quasi-things” that are neither entirely subjective nor entirely objective, that emerge out of a combination of aspects of environments, and that arouse affective reactions in perceivers. Recently, analytic philosophers have joined the debate on atmospheres, seeking to provide accounts that are firmly grounded in current research on metaphysics and affectivity: Pablo Fernandez Velasco & Takuya Niikawa (2025) defend a metaphysics of atmospheres, while René Jagnow (2024) puts forward a view of how atmospheric experiences are elicited and of how paintings can elicit them too. Interestingly, both Fernandez Velasco & Niikawa and Jagnow agree with phenomenologists in characterizing atmospheres as having an intrinsically affective dimension. As I shall argue, this claim is, however, not convincing. Still, it is natural to think of atmospheres as bound to producing affective reactions. The reason for this, I shall suggest, is likely to have something to do with the fact that atmospheres are properties of environments. Environments are typically experienced from within and a look at some contemporary media practices reveals that there is a quite widespread assumption that environments are particularly well-suited for producing affective reactions in experiencers.