Some Objections to Markus Gabriel’s New Realism

Abstract

The article critically examines the ontology of Markus Gabriel’s new realism, centered on the thesis that to exist is to appear in a field of sense. Based on an analysis of some of Gabriel’s most significant works, it is argued that his proposal, while seeking to overcome postmodern constructivism and naïve realism, ultimately undermines the very conditions of realism, thus failing in its original purpose. The paper contends that Gabriel’s rejection of the world as a totality and his ontological pluralism lead to a renewed form of relativism. In contrast, it defends a critical naturalism and a scientifically informed realism as alternatives capable of integrating epistemic plurality without sacrificing ontological unity. We include sections discussing what is precisely meant by naturalism and realism, and we argue in favor of these positions in accordance with contemporary science. The text concludes that Gabriel’s new realism does not transcend postmodernity but rather reformulates it in semantic terms.