Observaciones sobre la verdad: de Davidson a Wittgenstein. Remarks on truth. From Davidson to Wittgenstein

  • Pedro Rojas Parada
Keywords: Davidson, Wittgenstein, Rorty, Truth, Analytic, Synthetic, Dualism of scheme and content, Holism, Observation sentences, Theoretical sentences,

Abstract

Davidson claims that we will never be able to tell which of our beliefs are true. This paper aims at analysing and criticizing the reasons and assumptions underlying this claim; also tries to underpin an alternative position, drawn from Wittgenstein, which doesn’t have the drawbacks that Davidson’s theory does have.

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Published
2006-09-22
How to Cite
Rojas Parada P. (2006). Observaciones sobre la verdad: de Davidson a Wittgenstein. Remarks on truth. From Davidson to Wittgenstein. Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica, 39, 29-51. https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/ASEM/article/view/ASEM0606110029A
Issue
Vol. 39 (2006)
Section
Articles

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