From virtue epistemology to epistemic happiness

  • Andrés L. Jaume a:1:{s:5:"es_ES";s:33:"Universidad de las Islas Baleares";}
Keywords: Aquinas, epistemic reliabilism, epistemic happiness, epistemic responsibility, epistemic teleology, epistemic virtue, Sosa, Zagzebski

Abstract

This article aims to overcome the division between a reliabilist epistemology and a responsibilist one. Instead, it presents an organic view of human knowledge. The organic view, also known as pre-cismatic, integrates reliabilist and responsibilist aspects. Finally, a new concept is discussed: epistemic happiness, which is justified from an agentive perspective of knowledge. Thus, it is argued that it seems reasonable to think of knowledge as a type of action which ultimate goal is happiness. This happiness can be obtained through negative means - by not obtaining truth but improving the epistemic situation - or through positive means, i.e., when it hits the target of truth.

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Published
2024-05-23
How to Cite
Jaume A. L. (2024). From virtue epistemology to epistemic happiness. Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica, 57(1), 9-30. https://doi.org/10.5209/asem.92181
Section
Articles