Has the Naturalistic Fallacy Refutation Truly Defeated Classical Natural Law Theory?

  • Carlos A. Casanova Universidad Santo Tomás y Universidad Bernardo O’Higgins
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_ASEM.2014.v47.45801
Keywords: G. E. Moore, notion of the good, Hume’s law, realistic ethics, practical reason.

Abstract

This paper considers and distinguishes two objections which ordinarily are thought to oppose a realistic conception of ethics: G. E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s law. After having presented both objections, having developed their presuppositions and consequences and having answered each of them, the paper concludes that it is possible to hold today a realistic conception of ethics. It is structured in the style of a disputed question, divided in six articles.

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Published
2014-07-07
How to Cite
Casanova C. A. (2014). Has the Naturalistic Fallacy Refutation Truly Defeated Classical Natural Law Theory?. Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica, 47, 37-54. https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_ASEM.2014.v47.45801
Issue
Vol. 47 (2014)
Section
Articles

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