Formal Possibility as Contradiction in Hegel’s Logic

Abstract

This article analyzes Hegel’s definition of formal possibility as contradiction, examining its critical relationship with the philosophical tradition that, from medieval scholasticism to the Wolffian school, defined the possible as the absence of contradiction. After genealogically reconstructing this traditional conception from Thomas Aquinas to Kant, the systematic framework in which Hegel elaborates his antinomic definition is delimited: the constitutive relationship between possibility and actuality. The analysis focuses on the logical foundations that allow Hegel to identify formal possibility with contradiction, demonstrating that this identification results from the necessary relationship between the possible and the impossible. Through a formal reconstruction in terms of modal logic, the dialectical mechanism by which possibility is affirmed through the exclusion of its contrary is made explicit. Finally, it is demonstrated that the apparent Hegelian paradox constitutes a critical rescue of the notion of formal possibility, revealing its contradictory dimension as a necessary condition for understanding its transition towards real possibility.