Apoyo(s) parlamentario(s) antes que gobierno(s) de coalición. El caso español: 1993-1996 y 1996-2000

Abstract

Classical coalition theory predicts that, when no party attains parliamentary majority, coalitions will be formed in which the participating parties may profit from benefits, and these coalitions will be minimally winning, in order that such profit be maximal. But data from many countries along several decades reveal the existence of other formulas and, particularly, a striking occurrence of minority governments. To solve this apparent contradiction several explanations have been provided based on the relevance of the institutional framework and the context when opting for one or another of the possible options. Based on the formation of minority governments in Spain in 1993 and 1996, this paper analyses the implications of the persistence of historical fractures, the yield of the electoral system, the rules for the formation, continuity and removal of the government and the decision to opt for such governments as the most rational choice for their actors.