The Theory (of Secession) of The Permanent Minority From The Point of View of Deliberative Democracy

Abstract

This article uses the lens of deliberative democracy to examine the argument of the permanent minority as a possible ground for secession. According to this argument, Catalans (or Basques) are permanent minorities which, under no circumstances, could obtain the parliamentary majorities that would enable them to secede. Historically, this fact has created the conditions for sustained abuse. Nowadays, it prevents the success of secession processes which leaves Catalans with no alternative but to circumvent democratic means. The article concludes that this argument is either incompatible with deliberative democracy or collapses into an argument that justifies secession as reparation. The argument goes like this: if the interests of the minority have been adequately considered in a deliberative process, the decisions of the majority are justified and thus do not generate a right to secede; if those interests have been ignored, the decisions fail to meet the deliberative standards and generate a remedial right to secession.