Critique, Genealogy, Normativity. Koselleck, Foucault, and the historic-critical reflection on law

Abstract

In contemporary political philosophy, an ongoing debate concerns the relationship between genealogy and normativity, according to which the two are seen as mutually exclusive. This controversy is framed within the coordinates of the  Anglo-Saxon context, where the value of Foucault’s analyses for thinking  the legal domain has often been sidelined. This paper therefore proposes to revisit the connection that, in Foucauldian thought, links critique with genealogy as a method of philosophical inquiry, and with normativity as one of the dimensions of this relationship. The aim is to reassess the relevance of genealogical approaches within the legal field and to reinsert law as a valid object of historical-critical reflection. The article is structured in three parts: the first focuses on the notion of critique in the works of Foucault and Koselleck, both of whom explored how this issue has been shaped in the West since modernity. The second part addresses genealogy as a critical philosophical method in Foucault's thought. The third part examines how normativity lies at the core of Foucauldian philosophy, and explores the types of characterizations and distinctions Foucault made regarding it during the 1970s.