Two Functions of Perception in Kant
- Hemmo Laiho University of Turku, Finland
Resumo
Biografia do Autor
Hemmo Laiho received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Turku, Finland, in November 2012, upon completion of his award-winning thesis Perception in Kant’s Model of Experience. Since then, he has held various research and teaching positions in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Turku. In 2016, Laiho was a Fulbright Scholar in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, USA. Currently Laiho holds a research position at the Turku Institute for Advanced Studies. His areas of specialization include history of philosophy, especially Kant, philosophy of mind and perception, and aesthetics. His recent articles include: “Kant on Representing Negative States of Affairs” (Topoi, 2016) and “Two Kinds of Distinctness, Two Systems of Representation”, in V. L. Waibel, M. Ruffing & D. Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit (Berlin: deGruyter, 2018). Laiho is an editorial board member of the Amsterdam University Press series Crossing Boundaries: Turku Medieval and Early Modern Studies and a board member of the Philosophical Society of Finland.
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