Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy

Kant and the Duty to Stay in the State of Nature

Norbert Slenzok — 2025-11-05

The paper tackles the question as to whether Kant has successfully substantiated his claim that there exists a moral and juridical duty to leave the state of nature. Our thesis is that he has not. In the first step, it is demonstrated that Kant’s concept of provisional ownership is a logical impossibility. Thus, property rights themselves cannot generate the duty to submit to the state. The only way to argue for the duty to exit statelessness that the Kantian is left with is therefore to conceive of that duty as implied directly by the right to freedom. Yet, one may plausibly argue that at the conceptual level, public law runs afoul of Kant’s notion of freedom to a greater degree than private law does. Therefore, in virtue of the innate right to freedom, a prima facie duty arises to stay in the state of nature.

Kant's cosmopolitan interest in knowledge

Ana María Andaluz Romanillos — 2025-11-05

This article draws attention to the problem of the meaning of knowledge in Kant and the need for an orientation of knowledge. In this perspective, it takes into consideration the kantian distinction between the scholastic concept of philosophy and the cosmic concept of philosophy. Isofar as this concept of philosophy defends the orientation of knowledge towards the moral ends or moral destiny of humanity, it is possible to speak of a cosmopolitan interest of knowledge. The thesis of the article is that this concept of philosophy is linked to the presence of the notion of the interest of reason in Kant, being, moreover, consistent with Habermas's assessment of pure practical interest as a guiding interest of knowledge. It is structured in two points: 1. The interest of practical reason as a mobilising interest and a guiding interest of knowledge 2. The cosmic concept of philosophy as an expression of the cosmopolitan interest in and meaning of knowledge

«The human being is the only creature that must be educated». On the relationship between Kant’s education and philosophy of History

Inês Beatriz Ferreira — 2025-11-05

This essay aims to show the dialog that Kant’s suggestions for education establish with his philosophy of History. Starting from the thesis present in the Lessons on pedagogy which suggests that «The human being is the only creature that must be educated», we seek to justify it based on the Kantian concept of Bestimmung, according to which the realization of man’s vocation depends on a permanent effort of an intergenerational nature. Within this framework of ideas, the question concerning education reveals its importance in two senses: both the educational process which is intrinsically presupposed in the pathway towards the integral development of reason and the cultural and civilizational progress, and the educational process in the strict sense, considered as an institutionalized mechanism. On this level, we see Kant reinforcing the urgency of thinking about an educational system in line with the purposes of the human species and therefore reflecting in his suggestions for education – and in its four tasks: to discipline, cultivate, civilize and moralize – the path of maturation of reason in its various stages.

Kant, the European Commission, and the Unity of Reason

Antonio Sánchez Domínguez — 2025-11-05

The text examines the Treaty of Rome’s (1957) decision to designate the European executive body as the “Commission,” replacing the ECSC’s “High Authority.” It argues that this ostensibly bland, technical naming sought to avoid the appearance of supranational sovereignty while at the same time installing technocratic grammar that depoliticizes power. In light of Schmitt and Heidegger, it questions the alleged neutrality of technique and its capacity to conceal political decisions under the veil of the “technical.” The guiding thread is Kant: the distinction between the technical-practical and the moral-practical, and between the “moral politician” and the “political moralist.” Only the primacy of the moral-practical —of laws grounded in freedom, with every decision arising from natural determinations bracketed— can limit politics and orient the State toward perpetual peace; technical prudence yields management, cunning, and simulation. Applied to Europe, calling the executive a “Commission” would have been a ploy that predisposes the Union to the hegemony of technique, weakening transparency and even the possibility of understanding cosmopolitan right as a mandate. The essay concludes that this drift favors nihilism and civic disaffection: without a rearticulation of the unity of reason and of the person’s place, the institutional machinery becomes gearwork without a horizon.

The Bias Against Dependence: Women and Passive Citizenship in the Doctrine of Right.

Jorge Omar Rodríguez Ramírez — 2025-11-05

Kant distinguishes between passive and active citizens; only the latter are entitled to vote. The difficulty is that he never justified this restriction, so two main theses have been proposed to explain it: the corruption thesis, which holds that passive citizens, by virtue of their dependence, lack autonomous judgment and therefore cannot vote; and the interdependent-independence thesis, which argues that the issue is not judgment but social position—those who depend on others cannot be co-legislators. This article advances a middle position: passive citizenship is a social condition of dependence, yet there is also evidence that Kant distrusted the judgment of certain groups he deemed passive, such as women. I will argue that his analysis treats dependence through a bias: the dependent are presumed unable to judge on a par with active citizens.

Aesthetic Disinterestedness from a Metaphysical Point of View

Sílvia — 2025-11-05

What is the metaphysical significance of the aesthetic disinterestedness? In this paper, I address this question by examining the tension between aesthetic disinterest and intellectual—or metaphysical—interest in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. While aesthetic disinterestedness is often interpreted as a mark of the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere, I argue that this autonomy is deeply entangled with a reason’s aspiration towards systematic and metaphysical unity. Against the background of contemporary readings—particularly those of Dieter Henrich—I explore how the disinterested aesthetic attitude may serve as a starting point for a renewed engagement with the metaphysical dimension of Kant’s philosophy, offering a reinterpretation that resists ontologisation while highlighting the idealist orientation of Kant’s critical system.

The Role and Scope of Intuition (Anschauung) in Kant Transcendental Philosophy

Alexei Krioukov — 2025-11-05

Kant's notion of intuition is usually associated with the a priori forms of space and time. In my paper, firstly, I want to demonstrate that intuition is very complex and has different functions for transcendental consciousness and plays an important role in each function, secondly, to substantiate the thesis that this concept is key to understanding the principle of Kant's transcendental philosophy, and thirdly, to point out some aporias or problems associated with this concept. Here are some difficulties: the relationship between pure intuition and empirical intuition is problematic, and the function of intuition and representation is difficult to distinguish unambiguously. In my article, I will consider several key points in Kant's philosophy for which the concept of intuition plays its own special function.

Kant on Individual Noumena and the Limits of Discursive Understanding

Rodrigo Zanette de Araujo — 2025-11-05

It is relatively uncontroversial among scholars that, according to Kant, we cannot have determinate theoretical cognition of noumena. In this paper I shall argue that Kant’s account of the limits of human understanding allows us to draw a more radical conclusion: the very notion of an individual ‘intelligible being’ lies beyond human comprehension. I further suggest that this claim best conveys Kant’s ban of a positive use of the notion of noumenon. My investigation is guided by a question: Is it possible for concepts to successfully refer to an individual object in absence of sensible intuition? Or, to put it differently, is it possible to single out one or multiple individual noumena (and not mere concepts thereof) falling under a certain concept? I shall argue that, while we cannot exclude this possibility, we cannot comprehend (and thus admit) it either. My hope in this paper is thus to shed further light on Kant’s stance towards noumena.

The Davos Debate and essence of man

Francisco Joaquín Cortés García — 2025-11-05

The paper explores the philosophical debate between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger at the 1929 Davos Conferences, focusing on their divergent conceptions of the human being. Cassirer, from a Neo-Kantian perspective, emphasizes culture and symbols as key elements for understanding human experience. Heidegger, on the other hand, through his concept of Dasein, concentrates on individual existence, finitude, and authenticity. The debate, which took place in a context of intellectual and political crisis in interwar Europe, marked a bifurcation in the history of philosophical thought, revealing a clear divergence in the idea of man. The analysis also draws parallels between this debate and the characters in Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain, highlighting the influence of these ideas on 20th-century philosophical and cultural thought.

Situated universals (visions from the Third World)

Macarena Marey — 2025-11-05

This note is a version of an online talk I gave at the Workshop “Kant and Universalism from a Global Perspective”, October 25th 2024, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften. The event was organised by Marcus WIllaschek and Simon Rebohm. I took the chance to talk about the meaning of reading Kant in the Third World and my experience with the geopolitics of knowledge.

Critique is rooted in skepticism. Review of: Abraham Anderson, The Skeptical Roots of Critique: Hume’s Attack on Theology and the Origin of Kant’s Antinomy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025, 184 pp.

John Christian Laursen — 2025-11-05

Review of Abraham Anderson, The Skeptical Roots of Critique: Hume’s Attack on Theology and the Origin of Kant’s Antinomy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025, 184 pp.

Marcos Thisted’s Defense of the Thematic Unity and Doctrinal Consistency of the Fortschritte der Metaphysik

Noelia Eva Quiroga — 2025-11-05

Kant on Freedom of the Will and the Development of Classical German Philosophy. Review of: Jörg Noller and John Walsh (translators and editors), Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022, XLVII + 315 pp., ISBN: 978-1-108-72967-3

Sebastian Cabezas — 2025-11-05

Appeasing Suffering: A Confrontation with Our Kantian Imperfections. Review of: Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Kant on Social Suffering (Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2025, 74 pp. ISBN: 9781009446457.

Inês Pinheiro — 2025-11-05

Reinhard Brandt y el Archivo kantiano de Marburgo. Cómo citar: Aramayo, R. R. (2025). Reinhard Brandt y el Archivo kantiano de Marburgo en Kant. Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy, 22, 269-270.

Roberto R. Aramayo — 2025-11-05

How to do things with ideas: Katharina Kraus on the regulative function of Kant’s Ideas of Reason

Noam Hoffer — 2025-11-05

This paper offers a critical discussion of Katharina Kraus’s interpretation of Kant’s ideas of reason, as presented in her recent book. Kraus criticizes two opposing views, the ideas of reason as assumed noumenal entities or as mere heuristic fictions. While I share her dissatisfaction with these views, I suggest a more nuanced approach to them by emphasizing their normative grounds, especially in doctrinal non-evidential belief. As a solution to the problems of noumenalism and fictionalism, Kraus presents an elaborate perspectivalist reading of the ideas as serving a dual function: systematic structures for contexts of intelligibility and projected mind-independent normative standards for truth-evaluation. I raise questions about whether this account risks attributing a constitutive status to the ideas. I also suggest that the unique role of the idea of God is a regulative transformation of Kant’s pre-critical conception of God as the ground of the systematicity and necessity of the laws of nature. Building on Kraus’s insights, I propose an expressivist reading: the ideas of reason are meaningful not because they represent objects, hypothetical or fictional, but because they express the commitment to rational norms of inquiry. Because the ideas are expressions, they are grounded in reason’s norms of inquiry but are not constitutive of them.

Discussion of Katharina Kraus' Kant's Ideas of Reason

Jessica Tizzard — 2025-11-05

In this discussion of Katharina Kraus’ Cambridge Element Kant’s Ideas of Reason, I explore the interpretive upshot of her perspectivalist approach to the regulative use of ideas in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. After briefly summarizing her basic framework, I pose a series of questions about how her position could be interpreted as a form of modest noumenalism, focusing on the claim that a grounding relation to unconditioned reality is needed to maintain an objective criterion of truth. This leads to some brief reflections on the nature of objectivity in Kant’s broader philosophical system. I conclude by pointing out the advantages of her twofold approach to the regulative use of ideas, which serve both semantic and epistemic functions, and suggest this distinction is also essential to understanding the use of ideas in Kant’s practical philosophy.

How Many Types of Ideas Must be Considered to Reconstruct the Real Concept of Ideas in Kant?

Michael Lewin — 2025-11-05

Kraus’s ‘Kant’s Ideas of Reason’ offers a ‘perspectivalist interpretation’ of a part of the Transcendental Dialectic. I will focus on two central topics: the concept of ideas and the concept of reason. First, I argue that Kraus’s reconstruction of the concept of ideas requires significant refinement. Despite what the title of her work might suggest, her analysis is limited to transcendental ideas without engaging with Kant’s broader typology, which includes at least seven distinct types of ideas. Greater attention to the fundamental features of the concept of ideas, as well as to the relevant scholarship, could help avoid the introduction of the problematic ‘isms’ ‘noumenalism’ and ‘fictionalism’. Second, I highlight that Kraus does not clearly distinguish between reason in its broader and narrower senses, nor does she provide a precise definition of reason in the narrower sense. I propose modifying the ‘perspectivalist interpretation’ in accordance with my suggestions.

Author Replies to the Comments from Hoffer, Tizzard, and Lewin

Katharina Kraus — 2025-11-05

In what follows, I reply to the comments offered by Noam Hoffer, Jessica Tizzard, and Michael Lewin on my Cambridge Element on Kant’s Ideas of Reason (Cambridge University Press, 2025). Their insightful and diligent comments offer me the opportunity to clarify and refine my interpretation of the regulative use of ideas of reason – a particularly fascinating, but also deeply puzzling aspect of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. I also thank Paula Órdenes for initiating this special issue on my book in Con-Textos Kantianos and for inviting these three distinguished experts to contribute.

Interview with Pauline Kleingeld

Pauline Kleingeld — 2025-11-05

Kant’s Philosophical Context: Mendelssohn, Lessing and the Enlightenment

Pablo Genazzano — 2025-11-05

This introduction aims to present the contents and objectives of the dossier Kant’s Philosophical Context: Mendelssohn, Lessing and the Enlightenment. The introduction situates the dossier within recent historiographical efforts to move beyond classical narratives that cast “pre-Kantian figures” as merely transitional. It highlights how the collected articles explore Wolffian metaphysics in context, Mendelssohn’s proofs of God’s existence, and his articulation of Jewish philosophy, alongside Mendelssohn and Lessing’s influence on aesthetics and early Romantic criticism. By tracing continuities and tensions from Wolff to Schlegel through a focus on Mendelssohn and Lessing, the dossier reconstructs the plural and dialogical character of Enlightenment thought, vindicating the enduring relevance of these figures for understanding the diversity and fruitfulness of eighteenth-century German philosophy.

Before (and beyond) Kant’s Paralogisms: Wolff’s Psychologia Rationalis (1734) and Mendelssohn’s Phaedon (1767)

Guillem Sales Vilalta — 2025-11-05

This paper wants to defend two theses concerning the relationship between Kant’s critique of Rational Psychology and the contributions to this discipline made by Christian Wolff and Moses Mendelssohn, namely: (I) that Wolff’s Psychologia Rationalis (1734) does not align with Kant’s critique, not only because it seeks to explain empirical data, but more crucially because its most basic explanatory ground is itself derived from experience; (II) that Mendelssohn’s Phaedon (1767), which Kant regarded as a prime example of Rational Psychology, also fails to conform stricto sensu to Kant’s characterisation. To do so, the paper will include: (1) an introduction outlining the topic and its interest; (2) a section on Wolff’s Rational Psychology; (3) an analysis of Mendelssohn’s modulation of Wolffian Psychology; and (4) some conclusive remarks

Is Metaphysics the only Discipline that Can Be Complete?

Bruna Picas Prats — 2025-11-05

The aim of this article is twofold. First, against Marcus Willaschek’s statement that Kant’s systematicity of metaphysics is shared with the other sciences, it examines Kant’s assertion that metaphysics is the only discipline capable of achieving completeness. Second, this article explores the continuity between Kant and Wolff regarding the inquiry about what criterion of completeness is suitable for metaphysics as a system. To this end, we address two central questions: what does it mean for metaphysics to be ‘complete’? Is there something special about the completeness of metaphysics that is not shared by other sciences? We will identify two kinds of completeness, which we refer to as ‘unconditioned completeness’ and ‘comprehensiveness’ and demonstrate the continuity in how Kant and Wolff understand these terms. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that both Kant and Wolff argue that unconditioned completeness is unique to metaphysics. Finally, we will discuss why, despite these similarities, Kant would still be dissatisfied with Wolff’s conception of metaphysical completeness.

Kant and Mendelssohn about Idealism

Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira — 2025-11-05

This paper aims to reconstruct Kant’s Refutation of Idealism as a successful world-directed transcendental argument against Mendelssohn’s “problematic idealism.” Mendelssohn’s problematic idealism arises from both a metaphysical and an epistemological doctrine that has an undeniable Cartesian root. Metaphysically, he assumes what we may call a “commonsense realist” view: that appearances outside our mind in space are, in themselves, material in nature, just as appearances within our mind are, in themselves, mental in nature (a position he refers to as “dualism”). Epistemologically, Mendelssohn holds that there is a fundamental hiatus between the material and mental worlds since the inference from our internal representations to the purported external material things they supposedly copy is, at best, problematic—this is what we refer to as “indirect realism.” Kant’s Refutation challenges both aspects of this view. On the epistemological level, Kant argues that we have direct awareness of the existence of external material things in space. On the metaphysical level, he claims that the ultimate nature of external things is neither material nor mental but consists instead of mind-independent things-in-themselves—noumena in the negative sense. However, Kant’s argument can only succeed as a world-directed transcendental argument if it is able to establish the truth of a persistent mind-independent thing in itself is a necessary condition for the conscious of our existence determined in time.

God’s perfection and human perfection: Mendelssohn’s account in the Evidenzschrift and its relation to Wolff’s philosophy

Emanuel Lanzini Stobbe — 2025-11-05

This paper aims to present the relationship between God’s perfection (God as the most perfect being) and the obligation for human perfection in Mendelssohn’s essay Abhandlung über die Evidenz in metaphysischen Wissenschaften, particularly with regard to his reception of Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In the Abhandlung, Mendelssohn seeks to investigate how much certainty there can be in philosophy – therefore including both natural theology and practical philosophy. Against this background, if we are to consider the interconnection between divine and human perfection, we must regard (a) Mendelssohn’s ontological proof of God as the most perfect being, as well as a teleological proof concerning the perfection of the world (in the third chapter of the Abhandlung); and (b) his account of the obligation human beings have to pursue our own perfection and that of others (in the fourth chapter), which is ultimately connected to the notion of the reflection of God’s perfections. In this paper, we shall firstly present Mendelssohn’s account of God as the most perfect being, and that of the perfection of the world; secondly consider his account of the law of nature and the obligation to pursue perfection; so that thirdly we may examine both notions against the background of Christian Wolff’s philosophy (particularly his natural theology and practical philosophy), to show that although Mendelssohn was substantially influenced by Wolff in both regards, he also introduced new nuances not present in Wolff’s account

The Step into Existence: Reasoning toward God in Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours

José María Sánchez de León Serrano — 2025-11-05

This article offers a detailed analysis of Moses Mendelssohn’s novel proof of God’s existence as developed in chapter 16 of his philosophical testament, Morning Hours. The paper reconstructs the logical structure of the argument, situates it within Mendelssohn’s broader philosophical outlook, and explores its far-reaching implications. It also investigates the possible historical sources and conceptual affinities of the argument. While some scholars have read Mendelssohn’s argument as a version of Berkeleyan idealism, others highlight its cosmological or anti-idealist dimensions. The article concludes by assessing the philosophical significance and limits of Mendelssohn’s approach, arguing that it offers a compelling, if ultimately contestable, attempt to reconcile finite cognition with metaphysical realism through the postulation of an infinite intellect.

“What Is Jewish Philosophy? An Attempt at a Definition Based On Jerusalem (1783) By Moses Mendelssohn

Anaïs-Rivka Delambre — 2025-11-05

In this article, we look at the definition of “Jewish philosophy”, a concept whose contours remain unclear. Does the term simply refer to the cultural or religious affiliation of the philosophers concerned, or is there something in their philosophy itself that qualifies it as Jewish? To answer this question, we have drawn on the reflections of Eliezer Berkovits, who has defined Jewish philosophy as the incorporation of philosophical concepts and reasoning into a distinct Hebraic framework of thought and tradition. Using Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem as a case study, we refine and extend the concept of incorporation to show that Jewish philosophy is articulated between the universality of philosophical thought and the particularity of Jewish tradition.

Baumgarten’s Shift in Rationality. An Analysis through the Notion of “Extensive Clarity”

David Hereza-Modrego — 2025-11-05

The birth of aesthetics in Baumgarten is usually understood either as a continuation of Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism or as a rupture towards a proto-irrationalism. Neither of these interpretations proves adequate, for what is decisive in his work consists in a shift with respect to tradition that redefines the very idea of rationality. For this, it is hermeneutically necessary to distinguish two senses of confusion in Baumgarten’s work. The rereading of the rational that this distinction enables is what grants its full meaning to the notion of “extensive clarity.

The Power of Illusion. Disgust and Representability in Moses Mendelssohn’s Aesthetics

Serena Feloj — 2025-11-05

In the context of the emergence of aesthetics as an autonomous discipline in mid-eighteenth-century Germany, Moses Mendelssohn was one of the leading voices in the development of a new theory of sentiments and representation. In this context, Mendelssohn understood the need to delineate the limits of aesthetic representation and addressed the issue through an in-depth study of sentiments. In this article, I propose a study of the category of disgust in Mendelssohn's aesthetics, starting from his theory of aesthetic illusion. Disgust is, in fact, a feeling that cannot be reduced to the illusion created by the work of art but always refers to reality. To this end, I will refer mainly to the 82nd Literaturbrief, in which Mendelssohn expounds his study of disgust, and secondly to the Rhapsody as a text that reveals the need to deepen the theory of aesthetic illusion in light of the limits indicated through disgust. Finally, an aesthetic paradigm will emerge, which is also relevant to the contemporary debate on the possibilities of aesthetic representation

Lessing’s Influence on the Development of Mendelssohn’s Theory of Mixed Sentiments

Pablo Genazzano — 2025-11-05

This article investigates the influence of Lessing on Mendelssohn’s theory of mixed sentiments. It takes as its point of departure Lessing’s letter to Mendelssohn of 2 February 1757, which proposes that all passions, even unpleasant ones, can ultimately give rise to pleasure by making the soul aware of its own representational activity. The article first situates this principle in relation to Mendelssohn’s standpoint in On Sentiments (1755). It then shows how Mendelssohn adapted Lessing’s insight in his engagement with Burke, especially in response to the paradox of deriving pleasure from the misfortune of others. The analysis follows Mendelssohn’s reception of Burke in the 1761 edition of the Rhapsody, and culminates in its 1771 edition, where he reformulates Lessing’s principle to ground a more universal source of pleasure: not in the object itself, but in the soul’s reflection on its own representational powers

Lessing, Schlegel, and Romantic Enlightenment. On the incidence of Lessing in Schlegel's critique

Germán Garrido Miñambres — 2025-11-05

Along with Goethe, Lessing is the modern author to whom Friedrich Schlegel devoted the most attention. The 1804 prologue On the Essence of Criticism is considered indispensable for understanding the notion of criticism he develops throughout his work. However, influential authors such as Manfred Frank have prioritized Jacobi and his concept of feeling (Gefühl) in the philosophical origins of early Romanticism. This paper argues that Lessing was a referent of critical thought in Schlegel's early approaches to transcendental criticism. In particular, his early philosophical fragments presume a notion of critical thinking repeated in his 1797 review of Lessing and his characterization of Nathan.