Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy

Kant and the Duty to Stay in the State of Nature

Norbert Slenzok, Patryk Trzcionka — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The paper tackles the question as to whether Kant has successfully substantiated his claim that there exists a moral and juridical duty to leave the state of nature. Our thesis is that he has not. In the first step, it is demonstrated that Kant’s concept of provisional ownership is a logical impossibility. Thus, property rights themselves cannot generate the duty to submit to the state. The only way to argue for the duty to exit statelessness that the Kantian is left with is therefore to conceive of that duty as implied directly by the right to freedom. Yet, one may plausibly argue that at the conceptual level, public law runs afoul of Kant’s notion of freedom to a greater degree than private law does. Therefore, in virtue of the innate right to freedom, a prima facie duty arises to stay in the state of nature.

El interés cosmopolita del conocimiento en Kant

Ana María Andaluz Romanillos — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Este artículo llama la atención sobre el problema del sentido del conocimiento en Kant y la necesidad de una orientación del mismo. En esta perspectiva, toma en consideración la distinción kantiana entre el concepto escolar de la filosofía y el concepto cósmico de la misma. En la medida en que este concepto de filosofía defiende la orientación de los saberes hacia los fines morales o destino moral de la humanidad, se hace posible hablar de interés cosmopolita del conocimiento. La tesis del artículo es que dicho concepto de filosofía enlaza con la presencia de la noción de interés de la razón en Kant, siendo, además, consistente con la valoración, por Habermas, del interés puro práctico como un interés rector del conocimiento. Se estructura en dos puntos: 1. El interés de la razón práctica como interés movilizador e interés rector del conocimiento. 2. El concepto cósmico de la filosofía como expresión del interés cosmopolita del conocimiento y sentido de este.

"O homem é a única criatura que tem de ser educada". Sobre a relação entre a educação e a filosofia da História kantianas

Inês Beatriz Ferreira — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

O presente ensaio visa mostrar o diálogo que as sugestões de Kant para a educação estabelecem com a sua filosofia da História. Tendo como ponto de partida a tese, presente nas Lições sobre pedagogia, segundo a qual «O homem é a única criatura que tem de ser educada», discute-se a sua justificação a partir do conceito kantiano de Bestimmung, de acordo com o qual a concretização da vocação do homem depende de um esforço permanente e de natureza intergeracional. Neste quadro de ideias, a questão da educação revela a sua importância em dois sentidos: tanto a educação que está intrinsecamente pressuposta no processo de desenvolvimento integral da razão e no progresso cultural e civilizacional, como a educação em sentido estrito, considerada enquanto mecanismo institucionalizado. Neste plano, vemos Kant reforçar a urgência de pensar um sistema educativo conforme aos propósitos do género humano e a refletir nas suas sugestões para a educação – e nas suas quatro tarefas: disciplinar, cultivar, civilizar e moralizar – o trajeto de maturação da razão nas suas várias fases.

Kant, la Comisión europea y la Unidad de la razón

Antonio Sánchez Domínguez — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

El texto examina la decisión del Tratado de Roma (1957) de designar “Comisión” al órgano ejecutivo europeo, en sustitución de la “Alta Autoridad” de la CECA. Sostiene que esa elección nominal, aparentemente anodina y técnica, buscó evitar la apariencia de soberanía supranacional y, al mismo tiempo, instaló una gramática tecnocrática que despolitiza el poder. A la luz de Schmitt y Heidegger, se cuestiona la presunta neutralidad de la técnica y su capacidad para ocultar decisiones políticas bajo el velo de lo “técnico”. El hilo conductor es Kant: la distinción entre lo técnico-práctico y lo moral-práctico, y entre el “político moral” y el “moralista político”. Solo el primado de lo moral-práctico —de las leyes fundadas en la libertad y habiendo puesto entre paréntesis toda decisión con origen en las determinaciones naturales— puede limitar la política y orientar el Estado hacia la paz perpetua; la prudencia técnica produce gestión, astucia y simulación. Aplicado a Europa, llamar “Comisión” al ejecutivo habría sido una argucia que predispone a la Unión a la hegemonía de la técnica, debilitando la transparencia y la posibilidad de si quiera comprender el derecho cosmopolita como mandato. El ensayo concluye que esta deriva favorece el nihilismo y la desafección ciudadana: sin una rearticulación de la unidad de la razón y del lugar de la persona, la maquinaria institucional deviene engranaje sin horizonte.

El sesgo hacia la dependencia: mujeres y ciudadanía pasiva en la Doctrina del Derecho.

Jorge Omar Rodríguez Ramírez — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Kant distingue entre ciudadanos pasivos y activos, solo los primeros tienen derecho a votar. El problema es que Kant nunca justificó esta restricción, por lo que se han propuesto dos principales tesis para explicarla: la tesis de la corrupción, que considera que los ciudadanos pasivos carecen de juicio autónomo por lo que no pueden votar, y la tesis de la independencia interdependiente, que defiende que no es un problema de juicio, sino de su posición social: al depender de otros, no pueden ser co-legisladores. Este artículo sugiere una posición intermedia: la ciudadanía pasiva es una situación social de dependencia, pero también hay de que Kant desconfiaba de las capacidades de juicio de ciertos grupos que consideraba pasivos, como las mujeres. Defenderé que Kant analiza que la dependencia bajo el sesgo que los dependientes no pueden juzgar igual que los ciudadanos activos.

Aesthetic Disinterestedness from a Metaphysical Point of View

Sílvia Bento — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

What is the metaphysical significance of the aesthetic disinterestedness? In this paper, I address this question by examining the tension between aesthetic disinterest and intellectual—or metaphysical—interest in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. While aesthetic disinterestedness is often interpreted as a mark of the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere, I argue that this autonomy is deeply entangled with a reason’s aspiration towards systematic and metaphysical unity. Against the background of contemporary readings—particularly those of Dieter Henrich—I explore how the disinterested aesthetic attitude may serve as a starting point for a renewed engagement with the metaphysical dimension of Kant’s philosophy, offering a reinterpretation that resists ontologisation while highlighting the idealist orientation of Kant’s critical system.

The Role and Scope of Intuition (Anschauung) in Kant Transcendental Philosophy

Alexei Krioukov — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Kant's notion of intuition is usually associated with the a priori forms of space and time. In my paper, firstly, I want to demonstrate that intuition is very complex and has different functions for transcendental consciousness and plays an important role in each function, secondly, to substantiate the thesis that this concept is key to understanding the principle of Kant's transcendental philosophy, and thirdly, to point out some aporias or problems associated with this concept. Here are some difficulties: the relationship between pure intuition and empirical intuition is problematic, and the function of intuition and representation is difficult to distinguish unambiguously. In my article, I will consider several key points in Kant's philosophy for which the concept of intuition plays its own special function.

Kant on Individual Noumena and the Limits of Discursive Understanding

Rodrigo Zanette de Araujo — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

It is relatively uncontroversial among scholars that, according to Kant, we cannot have determinate theoretical cognition of noumena. In this paper I shall argue that Kant’s account of the limits of human understanding allows us to draw a more radical conclusion: the very notion of an individual ‘intelligible being’ lies beyond human comprehension. I further suggest that this claim best conveys Kant’s ban of a positive use of the notion of noumenon. My investigation is guided by a question: Is it possible for concepts to successfully refer to an individual object in absence of sensible intuition? Or, to put it differently, is it possible to single out one or multiple individual noumena (and not mere concepts thereof) falling under a certain concept? I shall argue that, while we cannot exclude this possibility, we cannot comprehend (and thus admit) it either. My hope in this paper is thus to shed further light on Kant’s stance towards noumena.

El Debate de Davos y la esencia del hombre

Francisco Joaquín Cortés García — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

El artículo explora el debate filosófico entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en las Conferencias de Davos de 1929, centrándose en sus divergentes concepciones del ser humano. Cassirer, desde una perspectiva neokantiana, enfatiza la cultura y los símbolos como elementos clave para entender la experiencia humana. Heidegger, por su parte, a través de su concepto de Dasein, se enfoca en la existencia individual, la finitud y la autenticidad. El debate, que tuvo lugar en un contexto de crisis intelectual y política en la Europa de entreguerras, marcó una bifurcación en la historia del pensamiento filosófico, mostrando una divergencia clara en la idea del hombre. El análisis también establece paralelismos entre este debate y los personajes de la novela La montaña mágica de Thomas Mann, destacando la influencia de estas ideas en el pensamiento filosófico y cultural del siglo XX.

Situated universals (visions from the Third World)

Macarena Marey — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Esta nota es una versio´n de una charla online que di en el Workshop “Kant and Universalism from a Global Perspective”, el día 25 de octubre de 2024, en la Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften. El evento fue organizado por Marcus WIllaschek y Simon Rebohm. Aproveché la oportunidad para hablar del sentido de leer a Kant en el Tercer Mundo y sobre mi experiencia con la geopolítica del conocimiento.

Critique is rooted in skepticism. Review of: Abraham Anderson, The Skeptical Roots of Critique: Hume’s Attack on Theology and the Origin of Kant’s Antinomy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025, 184 pp.

John Christian Laursen — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Resena de Abraham Anderson, The Skeptical Roots of Critique: Hume’s Attack on Theology and the Origin of Kant’s Antinomy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025, 184 pp.

Una defensa de Marcos Thisted sobre la unidad temática y la coherencia doctrinal de los Fortschritte der Metaphysik. Reseña de: Thisted, Marcos A. Kant y la metafísica crítica circa 1792-1795. Análisis e interpretación de los Fortschritte der Metaphysik. Cuadernos Kantianos, Revista de Estudios Kantianos, 2024, 200 páginas.

Noelia Eva Quiroga — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Kant on Freedom of the Will and the Development of Classical German Philosophy. Review of: Jörg Noller and John Walsh (translators and editors), Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022, XLVII + 315 pp., ISBN: 978-1-108-72967-3

Sebastian Cabezas — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Appeasing Suffering: A Confrontation with Our Kantian Imperfections. Review of: Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Kant on Social Suffering (Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2025, 74 pp. ISBN: 9781009446457.

Inês Pinheiro — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Reinhard Brandt y el Archivo kantiano de Marburgo. Cómo citar: Aramayo, R. R. (2025). Reinhard Brandt y el Archivo kantiano de Marburgo en Kant. Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy, 22, 269-270.

Roberto R. Aramayo — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

How to do things with ideas: Katharina Kraus on the regulative function of Kant’s Ideas of Reason

Noam Hoffer — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This paper offers a critical discussion of Katharina Kraus’s interpretation of Kant’s ideas of reason, as presented in her recent book. Kraus criticizes two opposing views, the ideas of reason as assumed noumenal entities or as mere heuristic fictions. While I share her dissatisfaction with these views, I suggest a more nuanced approach to them by emphasizing their normative grounds, especially in doctrinal non-evidential belief. As a solution to the problems of noumenalism and fictionalism, Kraus presents an elaborate perspectivalist reading of the ideas as serving a dual function: systematic structures for contexts of intelligibility and projected mind-independent normative standards for truth-evaluation. I raise questions about whether this account risks attributing a constitutive status to the ideas. I also suggest that the unique role of the idea of God is a regulative transformation of Kant’s pre-critical conception of God as the ground of the systematicity and necessity of the laws of nature. Building on Kraus’s insights, I propose an expressivist reading: the ideas of reason are meaningful not because they represent objects, hypothetical or fictional, but because they express the commitment to rational norms of inquiry. Because the ideas are expressions, they are grounded in reason’s norms of inquiry but are not constitutive of them.

Discussion of Katharina Kraus' Kant's Ideas of Reason

Jessica Tizzard — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In this discussion of Katharina Kraus’ Cambridge Element Kant’s Ideas of Reason, I explore the interpretive upshot of her perspectivalist approach to the regulative use of ideas in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. After briefly summarizing her basic framework, I pose a series of questions about how her position could be interpreted as a form of modest noumenalism, focusing on the claim that a grounding relation to unconditioned reality is needed to maintain an objective criterion of truth. This leads to some brief reflections on the nature of objectivity in Kant’s broader philosophical system. I conclude by pointing out the advantages of her twofold approach to the regulative use of ideas, which serve both semantic and epistemic functions, and suggest this distinction is also essential to understanding the use of ideas in Kant’s practical philosophy.

How Many Types of Ideas Must be Considered to Reconstruct the Real Concept of Ideas in Kant?

Michael Lewin — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Kraus’s ‘Kant’s Ideas of Reason’ offers a ‘perspectivalist interpretation’ of a part of the Transcendental Dialectic. I will focus on two central topics: the concept of ideas and the concept of reason. First, I argue that Kraus’s reconstruction of the concept of ideas requires significant refinement. Despite what the title of her work might suggest, her analysis is limited to transcendental ideas without engaging with Kant’s broader typology, which includes at least seven distinct types of ideas. Greater attention to the fundamental features of the concept of ideas, as well as to the relevant scholarship, could help avoid the introduction of the problematic ‘isms’ ‘noumenalism’ and ‘fictionalism’. Second, I highlight that Kraus does not clearly distinguish between reason in its broader and narrower senses, nor does she provide a precise definition of reason in the narrower sense. I propose modifying the ‘perspectivalist interpretation’ in accordance with my suggestions.

Author Replies to the Comments from Hoffer, Tizzard, and Lewin

Katharina Kraus — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In what follows, I reply to the comments offered by Noam Hoffer, Jessica Tizzard, and Michael Lewin on my Cambridge Element on Kant’s Ideas of Reason (Cambridge University Press, 2025). Their insightful and diligent comments offer me the opportunity to clarify and refine my interpretation of the regulative use of ideas of reason – a particularly fascinating, but also deeply puzzling aspect of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. I also thank Paula Órdenes for initiating this special issue on my book in Con-Textos Kantianos and for inviting these three distinguished experts to contribute.

Interview with Pauline Kleingeld

Pauline Kleingeld, Fiorella Tomassini — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Kant’s Philosophical Context: Mendelssohn, Lessing and the Enlightenment

Pablo Genazzano, Guillem Sales Vilalta — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This introduction aims to present the contents and objectives of the dossier Kant’s Philosophical Context: Mendelssohn, Lessing and the Enlightenment. The introduction situates the dossier within recent historiographical efforts to move beyond classical narratives that cast “pre-Kantian figures” as merely transitional. It highlights how the collected articles explore Wolffian metaphysics in context, Mendelssohn’s proofs of God’s existence, and his articulation of Jewish philosophy, alongside Mendelssohn and Lessing’s influence on aesthetics and early Romantic criticism. By tracing continuities and tensions from Wolff to Schlegel through a focus on Mendelssohn and Lessing, the dossier reconstructs the plural and dialogical character of Enlightenment thought, vindicating the enduring relevance of these figures for understanding the diversity and fruitfulness of eighteenth-century German philosophy.

Before (and beyond) Kant’s Paralogisms: Wolff’s Psychologia Rationalis (1734) and Mendelssohn’s Phaedon (1767)

Guillem Sales Vilalta — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This paper defends two theses concerning the relationship between Kant’s critique of Rational Psychology and the contributions to this discipline made by Christian Wolff and Moses Mendelssohn, namely: (I) that Wolff’s Psychologia Rationalis (1734) is not in fact vulnerable to Kant’s charges, not only because it seeks to explain empirical data, but more crucially because its most basic explanatory ground is itself derived from experience; and that Mendelssohn’s Phaedon (1767), which Kant regarded as a prime example of Rational Psychology, likewise is not adequately captured by Kant’s critique. To do so, the paper will include: (1) an introduction outlining the topic and its interest; a section on Wolff’s Rational Psychology; (3) an analysis of Mendelssohn’s modification of Wolffian Psychology; and some concluding remarks

Is Metaphysics the only Discipline that Can Be Complete?

Bruna Picas Prats, Dino Jakušić — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The aim of this article is twofold. First, against Marcus Willaschek’s statement that Kant’s systematicity of metaphysics is shared with the other sciences, it examines Kant’s assertion that metaphysics is the only discipline capable of achieving completeness. Second, this article explores the continuity between Kant and Wolff regarding the inquiry about what criterion of completeness is suitable for metaphysics as a system. To this end, we address two central questions: what does it mean for metaphysics to be ‘complete’? Is there something special about the completeness of metaphysics that is not shared by other sciences? We will identify two kinds of completeness, which we refer to as ‘unconditioned completeness’ and ‘comprehensiveness’ and demonstrate the continuity in how Kant and Wolff understand these terms. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that both Kant and Wolff argue that unconditioned completeness is unique to metaphysics. Finally, we will discuss why, despite these similarities, Kant would still be dissatisfied with Wolff’s conception of metaphysical completeness.

Kant and Mendelssohn about Idealism

Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Este artículo tiene como objetivo reconstruir la Refutación del Idealismo de Kant como un argumento trascendental exitoso dirigido al mundo contra el “idealismo problemático” de Mendelssohn. El idealismo problemático de Mendelssohn surge tanto de una doctrina metafísica como epistemológica que tiene una raíz cartesiana innegable. Metafísicamente, él asume lo que podemos llamar una visión “realista de sentido común”: que las apariencias fuera de nuestra mente en el espacio son, en sí mismas, materiales por naturaleza, al igual que las apariencias dentro de nuestra mente son, en sí mismas, mentales por naturaleza (una posición que él llama “dualismo”). Epistemológicamente, Mendelssohn sostiene que hay una brecha fundamental entre los mundos material y mental, ya que la inferencia de nuestras representaciones internas a las supuestas cosas materiales externas que supuestamente copian es, en el mejor de los casos, problemática—esto es lo que llamamos “realismo indirecto”. La Refutación de Kant desafía ambos aspectos de esta visión. En el nivel epistemológico, Kant argumenta que tenemos conciencia directa de la existencia de cosas materiales externas en el espacio. En el nivel metafísico, él afirma que la naturaleza última de las cosas externas no es ni material ni mental, sino que consiste en cosas en sí mismas independientes de la mente—noumena en el sentido negativo. Sin embargo, el argumento de Kant solo puede tener éxito como un argumento trascendental dirigido al mundo si es capaz de establecer la verdad de que una cosa persistente independiente de la mente en sí misma es una condición necesaria para la conciencia de nuestra existencia determinada en el tiempo.

God’s perfection and human perfection: Mendelssohn’s account in the Evidenzschrift and its relation to Wolff’s philosophy

Emanuel Lanzini Stobbe — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This paper aims to present the relationship between God’s perfection (God as the most perfect being) and the obligation for human perfection in Mendelssohn’s essay Abhandlung über die Evidenz in metaphysischen Wissenschaften, particularly with regard to his reception of Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In the Abhandlung, Mendelssohn seeks to investigate how much certainty there can be in philosophy – therefore including both natural theology and practical philosophy. Against this background, if we are to consider the interconnection between divine and human perfection, we must regard (a) Mendelssohn’s ontological proof of God as the most perfect being, as well as a teleological proof concerning the perfection of the world (in the third chapter of the Abhandlung); and (b) his account of the obligation human beings have to pursue our own perfection and that of others (in the fourth chapter), which is ultimately connected to the notion of the reflection of God’s perfections. In this paper, we shall firstly present Mendelssohn’s account of God as the most perfect being, and that of the perfection of the world; secondly consider his account of the law of nature and the obligation to pursue perfection; so that thirdly we may examine both notions against the background of Christian Wolff’s philosophy (particularly his natural theology and practical philosophy), to show that although Mendelssohn was substantially influenced by Wolff in both regards, he also introduced new nuances not present in Wolff’s account

The Step into Existence: Reasoning toward God in Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours

José María Sánchez de León Serrano — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This article offers a detailed analysis of Moses Mendelssohn’s novel proof of God’s existence as developed in chapter 16 of his philosophical testament, Morning Hours. The paper reconstructs the logical structure of the argument, situates it within Mendelssohn’s broader philosophical outlook, and explores its far-reaching implications. It also investigates the possible historical sources and conceptual affinities of the argument. While some scholars have read Mendelssohn’s argument as a version of Berkeleyan idealism, others highlight its cosmological or anti-idealist dimensions. The article concludes by assessing the philosophical significance and limits of Mendelssohn’s approach, arguing that it offers a compelling, if ultimately contestable, attempt to reconcile finite cognition with metaphysical realism through the postulation of an infinite intellect.

“What Is Jewish Philosophy? An Attempt at a Definition Based On Jerusalem (1783) By Moses Mendelssohn

Anaïs-Rivka Delambre — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In this article, we look at the definition of “Jewish philosophy”, a concept whose contours remain unclear. Does the term simply refer to the cultural or religious affiliation of the philosophers concerned, or is there something in their philosophy itself that qualifies it as Jewish? To answer this question, we have drawn on the reflections of Eliezer Berkovits, who has defined Jewish philosophy as the incorporation of philosophical concepts and reasoning into a distinct Hebraic framework of thought and tradition. Using Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem as a case study, we refine and extend the concept of incorporation to show that Jewish philosophy is articulated between the universality of philosophical thought and the particularity of Jewish tradition.

El viraje de la racionalidad en Baumgarten. Una aproximación a partir de la noción de “claridad extensiva”

David Hereza-Modrego — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

El nacimiento de la estética en Baumgarten suele entenderse o bien como prolongación del racionalismo leibniziano-wolffiano, o bien como ruptura hacia un proto-irracionalismo. Ninguna de estas interpretaciones resulta adecuada, pues lo decisivo en su obra consiste en un viraje respecto a la tradición que redefine la misma idea de racionalidad. Para ello, resulta hermenéuticamente necesario diferenciar dos sentidos de confusión en la obra de Baumgarten. La relectura de lo racional que esta distinción permite es la que otorga su significación plena a la noción de “claridad extensiva”.

The Power of Illusion. Disgust and Representability in Moses Mendelssohn’s Aesthetics

Serena Feloj — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In the context of the emergence of aesthetics as an autonomous discipline in mid-eighteenth-century Germany, Moses Mendelssohn was one of the leading voices in the development of a new theory of sentiments and representation. In this context, Mendelssohn understood the need to delineate the limits of aesthetic representation and addressed the issue through an in-depth study of sentiments. In this article, I propose a study of the category of disgust in Mendelssohn's aesthetics, starting from his theory of aesthetic illusion. Disgust is, in fact, a feeling that cannot be reduced to the illusion created by the work of art but always refers to reality. To this end, I will refer mainly to the 82nd Literaturbrief, in which Mendelssohn expounds his study of disgust, and secondly to the Rhapsody as a text that reveals the need to deepen the theory of aesthetic illusion in light of the limits indicated through disgust. Finally, an aesthetic paradigm will emerge, which is also relevant to the contemporary debate on the possibilities of aesthetic representation

Lessing’s Influence on the Development of Mendelssohn’s Theory of Mixed Sentiments

Pablo Genazzano — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This article investigates the influence of Lessing on Mendelssohn’s theory of mixed sentiments. It takes as its point of departure Lessing’s letter to Mendelssohn of 2 February 1757, which proposes that all passions, even unpleasant ones, can ultimately give rise to pleasure by making the soul aware of its own representational activity. The article first situates this principle in relation to Mendelssohn’s standpoint in On Sentiments (1755). It then shows how Mendelssohn adapted Lessing’s insight in his engagement with Burke, especially in response to the paradox of deriving pleasure from the misfortune of others. The analysis follows Mendelssohn’s reception of Burke in the 1761 edition of the Rhapsody, and culminates in its 1771 edition, where he reformulates Lessing’s principle to ground a more universal source of pleasure: not in the object itself, but in the soul’s reflection on its own representational powers

Lessing, Schlegel y la ilustración romántica. Sobre la incidencia de Lessing en la crítica de Schlegel

Germán Garrido Miñambres — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Lessing es, junto con Goethe, el autor moderno al que Friedrich Schlegel dedicó mayor atención. El prólogo Sobre la esencia de la crítica de 1804 se considera un testimonio imprescindible para entender la noción de crítica que desarrolla en toda su obra. Sin embargo, autores tan influyentes como Manfred Frank han dado preeminencia a Jacobi y su noción de sentimiento (Gefühl) en la génesis filosófica del primer romanticismo. El presente trabajo propone que Lessing estuvo ya presente como referente de un pensamiento crítico en las primeras aproximaciones de Schlegel a la crítica trascendental. En concreto, los primeros fragmentos filosóficos presumen una noción de pensamiento crítico que se repite en la reseña sobre Lessing de 1797 y su caracterización de Nathan el sabio.