Why is the mādhyamaka not a form of nihilism? Understanding the abandonment of Nāgārjuna's discussion

Abstract

Mādhyamaka or Middle Way, the reformulation of the Buddha’s teaching introduced by Nāgārjuna in the 2nd century, caused profound misunderstanadings in its reception context, and it still does among Western readers. The interpretation of its being another form of intellectually fruitless and ethically irresponsable nihilism has always accompanied this demanding philosophy. We will try to answer this objection by resorting to some tools the Middle Way provides.

In particular, we will understand what Nāgārjuna meant by abandoning philosophical discussion; we will clarify the self-image of being a practical, useful discourse despite not conceptually capturing the truth; we will explore the new relationship this way of reasoning establishes with mainstream philosophy; and we will review some of its current nihilist misreadings. As allies to clarify the words of the most famous mādhyamika, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, we count on Jeffrey Hopkins, C.W. Huntington, Juan Arnau, Giuseppe Ferraro and Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche among others.