Medieval Apophaticism and the Standard Narrative on Metaphors

Abstract

Apophaticism is usually defined as the view according to which God’s essence is unknowable and, thus, ineffable. Despite constituting a venerable tradition in all global faiths, it has been largely ignored by analytic philosophers of religion. In the past decade, efforts have been made to rectify such a situation, and some scholars have sought support for their apophatic views in medieval sources. Against this background, the present paper aims to contribute by offering a new and more accurate depiction of medieval apophaticism. More specifically, the claim is that it should not be conceived as a continuous theoretical spectrum. Departing from the scholarly mainstream, the paper proposes to distinguish between two discrete kinds: ‘moderate apophaticism’ and ‘radical apophaticism’ – the latter of which has gone unnoticed in the relevant literature. It will be shown that these two independent positions – exemplified by Thomas Aquinas and John Scotus Eriugena, respectively – derive from opposite conceptions of God. To highlight the relevance of this proposal, the paper will demonstrate how the recognition of radical apophaticism leads to challenging the so-called ‘standard narrative’ on metaphors, especially regarding whether they could be admitted into philosophy.