Humean Rationality: More Than Purely Instrumental?

Abstract

David Hume's theory of practical rationality has been analysed in detail in the history of ethical, political and economic thought. It is often ascribed a purely instrumental conception of rationality, in which practical reasons are merely instruments to achieve ends desired by agencies other than reason. This paper aims to challenge this interpretation by arguing that while Hume criticises the role of reason in practical decision-making, his theory of practical rationality is much more complex and contains normative elements.

In his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, John Rawls formulates and develops this standard interpretation of Hume in a paradigmatic way by claiming that his theory of rationality is purely empirical, psychological and instrumental. Rawls argues that Hume does not provide a solid foundation for morality, leading to the conclusion that practical rationality is simply a matter of coherence between means and ends. However, it can be argued conclusively that Rawls ignores the complexity of Humean theory. Hume's critique of reason does not imply that it lacks a normative foundation. Rather, it suggests a reconfiguration of how we should understand morality and rationality.