Dimension of “truth” from the “phenomenal” conception of reality: rethinking of the metaphysical structure and issues related to Nietzschean perspectivism
Abstract
The purpose of the following article is to analyze, from Nietzsche’s logical perspectivism, the classic concept of truth referred as what we know, and what our intellect understands. Taking a deep look at this concept from Nietzsche´s point of view, allows us to understand how much of a human´s will comes from itself and, at the same time, ends on itself. This verifies that intuition about things does not respond to an ontological or metaphysical truth; but that they are part of an even more complex phenomenal sphere. In this way, it is admitted that this determination of the "truth” is constituted and determined by the concept of value that the individual gives to things; thus, discarding any metaphysical or transmundane necessity that justifies a theory of immanent knowledge.
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