The rol of judgments of perception and empirical concepts in the categorical synthesis
Abstract
In this work I aim to show, first of all, an interpretation of the Kantian distinction between judgments of perception and judgment of experience. Secondly, I will reconstruct the process of categorical synthesis and thereby I will also try to shed some light on the role played by empirical concepts in this sort of action. The thesis I will be sustaining is that both empirical concepts and judgments of perception make this objective synthesis possible and that, at the same time, this synthesis provides meaning and reference to the concepts, both empirical and pure, involved in this action.
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