Hegel and Heidegger’s reading inhibitions. (The misadventures of the difference in the Heideggerian reading of Hegel)

Abstract

It’s about evidencing the presuppositions of the Heideggerian reading of Hegel. Hegelians and anti-Hegelians have assumed these presuppositions as something incontestable; some moved by the need to combat the return of the Hegelian spectrum, others by the need to release it from the onto-theological stigma. The result of it is a reductionist interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy, which gives most of its fundamental concepts to Heidegger’s critics, considering them contaminated by the totalitarism of closure and identity. An interpretation like this lies, however, on very questionable assumptions that should be made explicit, and among which we can highlight the Heideggerian interpretation of the Aufhebung as overcoming of difference. The purpose of this article is to pursue the adventures of difference in some key points of the Hegelian dialectic (fundamentally: the figure of the unhappy consciousness and the logical category of Reflection) that Heidegger deals insufficiently in his commentary, using suspicious maneuvers that they can be read as symptoms of an inhibition.