On examples and circumlocutions. About the metaphorical "logos" in Plato’s "Statesman"

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show that, in the Statesman, Plato systematically investigates the metaphorical nature of logos: we, who speak, and speaking understand each other, can’t do it without making comparisons, giving examples or making use of models or paradigms, whether we realize it or not, whenever we want to understand something. Particularly, the so-called “method of divisions” needs the examples, in order to be driven by them in the discovery of differences and similarities. As a matter of fact, this metaphorical feature of logos is uncovered in the attempt to hunt the statesman, which structures the dialogue from beginning to end. The major difficulty in this chase is due to the misleading example that surreptitiously guides it from the start: the paradigm of herdsman. That is why, in order to hunt the statesman, it is required turning round and round, as well as starting again some times, since the example that leads the pursuit must be explicit and must be a good example, one that enables to understand. But, reformulated as the quest of a good paradigm to understand what politics is, the chase of the statesman raises some problems in relation to the link between logos and similitude. The present article focuses on one of them: the difficulty to explain what an example is and the consequent need to propose something so paradoxical as an example of example.