Habermas, Rorty and the Relationship between Truth and Justification
Abstract
This article aims to clarify the relationship between the Truth and Justification in the philosophies of Jürgen Habermas and Richard Rorty from their discussions. The thesis that I advocate is that the relationship between Truth and Justification depends on the Ontological and Epistemological assumptions that each maintains and is not a matter of conditions of speech as stated by Habermas.Downloads
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