Negativity from Kant to Hegel: Aesthetic Judgment and Speculative Language

Abstract

The essay presents an interpretation of Hegel’s speculative sentence that, emphasizing the “counter-thrust” (Gegenstoss) that the modern (knowing) subject undergoes here, allows us to connect the movement of the Hegelian subject to the negativity recognised by Kant at the bottom of the faculty of judgment with regard to its aesthetic dimension. This way, it aims, first, to put into question the interpretation that sees in Hegel’s philosophy a regression with regard to the consciousness, attained by Kant, of the finitude, or the constitutive split, of the modern subject, and, finally, in line with recent interpretations of Hegel, like those of Žižek or Malabou, to contribute to the questioning of the traditional interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics as the overcoming of negativity into a final reconciling synthesis.