Phenomena and Beliefs in Aristotle. An interpretation on the methodological role of endoxa in natural science
Abstract
In this paper I aim to offer a unified interpretation of Aristotle’s methodology understood as a procedure which is part of his hybrid empiricism in which the double face of phainomena – observed facts and common opinions – is an integral part. I argue against the coherentist lecture on the dialectic proof of consistence (EN VII 1) and explain why is the double face of phaenomena of real use in natural science (Ph. IV 4).
Downloads
Article download
Crossmark
License
In order to support the global exchange of knowledge, the journal Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica is allowing unrestricted access to its content as from its publication in this electronic edition, and as such it is an open-access journal. The originals published in this journal are the property of the Complutense University of Madrid and any reproduction thereof in full or in part must cite the source. All content is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 use and distribution licence (CC BY 4.0). This circumstance must be expressly stated in these terms where necessary. You can view the summary and the complete legal text of the licence.
