The paradox of the inverse probability argument
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze the paradox of inverse probability described by Corax of Syracuse and Tisias from a historical and systematic point of view. First, its different versions are exposed. Second, the probability argument and the reciprocal argumentation are described and the refutations developed by Plato and Aristotle are studied. Whereas Plato emphasized the distinction between truth and probability, Aristotle analyzed the different meanings of probability. The selfreferential structure on which Corax’s paradox is based will be reconstructed. Finally, the inverse probability argument is systematically evaluated. In this paper it is argued that the method applied by Corax was aimed at invalidating the legal procedure by introducing the paradox of inverse probability.
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