Neurosciences, artificial intelligence and human interiority

Abstract

Currently, there are many reasons to dismiss the claim of a 'human interiority' as a nonsense. Indeed, the astonishing development of neuroscience and AI promises to be able to explain the human mind, at least in principle, from the exclusive perspective of the observer (objective, third person perspective). Moreover, a good number of contemporary philosophers advocate for the abolition of the interior-exterior dichotomy. This article will examine these arguments and attempt to rebuild the foundations of that lost interiority. To this end, it will be essential to engage in dialogue with neuroscience and computer science. The analogies of Leibniz's "mill" and John Searle's "Chinese room" will greatly aid this purpose, as will the notion of the "incommensurability" of physical and mental phenomena. Finally, we will present a model of articulation between realities of such different kinds.