A classification of ethical harm
Abstract
This paper discusses a classification of types of harm linked to actions concerning (in)justice. Although the starting point is Aristotelian practical philosophy, in this research this perspective is extended and criticised. Once a first approach to the object of the study (the harm that results for others from the agent's action or omission) has been defined, a classification of the types of harm will be established. In doing so, it will be shown where the Stagirite's proposition needs to be expanded, qualified, and even corrected. In particular, a commonly overlooked element will be highlighted: that the most perverse effect of an injustice is to make the one who commits it unjust.
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